This is a part of the outcome of a project 'A documentary study on 'Great Leap Famine' under the project of Transmission and Recognition of Grievous Loss, led by Stephan Feuchtwang, funded by the ESRC (2002-06). It was based on “‘Dayuejing’ Yundong (Fujian Juan)” [“Great Leap Forward” Campaign (Fujian Volume)], the CCP History Research Office of Fujian Province, Beijing: CCP History Publishing House, 2001
NB: Three pairs of reverse rectifications involving all levels of the Party and outside the Party:
1st: 1956-7 Anti-Leftist (Sep 1956, Eighth CPC Central Committee first plenary meeting) then anti-Rightist (Eighth CPC Central Committee second plenary meeting in Nov 1956) from June 1957 to start a Party rectification campaign against subjectivism, sectarianism and bureaucracy. The Eighth CPC Central Committee's third plenary meeting from 20 September -10 Oct 1957 stressed that the contradictions between proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the socialist road and the capitalist road are the main contradictions in Chinese society. Furthermore, it was thought that correcting leftist rashness in 1956 was wrong.
2nd: 1958-9 Anti-Leftist (Eighth CPC Central Committee sixth plenary meeting from Nov - Dec 1958). This was the first time the party corrected "leftist" mistakes on the initiative of Mao Zedong after the "Great Leap Forward" campaign was launched. The Eighth CPC Central Committee seventh plenary session from April 2, 1959 -5 in Shanghai summed up the campaign: to rectify communalization and "leftist" mistakes in the people's commune system by a series of management principles. The plenary meeting again criticized the " rash advance (反冒进)", then August 1959-1960 anti-Rightist-Opportunist. The Eighth CPC Central Committee eighth plenary session in August 1959 in Lushan launched a struggle against what was named the Peng Dehuai-led anti-party clique rightist opportunism.
3rd: 1961 anti-Leftist. The Eighth CPC Central Committee ninth plenary session in January 1961 formally approved of the restructuring of the national economy with the eight-character principle of "adjustment, consolidation, enrichment and improvement." This ended the "Great Leap Forward". Then in 1962, in the anti-Right Socialist Education Campaign (Eighth CPC Central Committee tenth plenary meeting in September 1962), Mao Zedong chaired the meeting and delivered a report on class, the situation, the contradictions and party unity. He made a call "Do not forget class struggle". The plenary launched another criticism and struggle against Peng Dehuai, etc. It also criticized the so-called "dark wind黑暗风" and "reverse wind翻案风", ideological and theoretical preparations for the subsequent launch of the anti-Revisionist Cultural Revolution of 1966.
The CCP’s Eighth National Congress first Plenary Session in September 1956 marked the beginning of a tortuous period of the Chinese comprehensive development of socialist construction. At this Congress Liu Shaoqi pointed out clearly in his political report that in the future ideologically and organizationally we must often fight against corruption and degeneration and clean out incorrigible, degenerate and corrupt elements from the party. In November, at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Party’s Congress Liu Shaoqi once again stressed the need to prevent leadership privileges. Mao Zedong at the meeting also warned that the party needed to guard against the formation of a “noble estate (贵族阶层)” in the party which separates itself from the masses. According to Mao Zedong’s recommendations the meeting decided to carry out a rectification campaign within the party (“党内整风运动”) from the second half of 1957. The aim of the campaign was to rectify subjectivism, sectarianism and bureaucracy. On 27 April 1957 the CPC Central Committee issued “Instructions for the rectification campaign”.They clearly defined the purpose, requirements, principles and methods of the rectification campaign. It was published on the 1st May, in the “People’s Daily” which officially started the rectification campaign in the whole party.
The 1957 Anti-Rightist rectification campaign reversing the Hundred Flowers rectification campaign
General speaking The CPC Central Committee at the Party’s Eighth National Congress in September 1956 had proposed a balanced guideline. It should be anti-conservative, as well as against “rash advance” and go ahead steadily with economic development. In order to implement these guidelines Fuzhou City developed a series of policies based on the real situation, political and economic. In 1957 Fuzhou completed the first five-year economic plan, revenue increased, there was price stability, people’s living standards improved, the cadres working style was democratic, there was social stability, the prestige of the party among the masses was high, the masses believed in the cause of socialist revolution and construction, and hundreds would respond to a single call from the party.
On 16th May, the Ningde prefectural Party committee in eastern Fujian formulated a “Deal with impure cadres’ plan”. It thought that in the early years of liberation, in East Fujian due to the “cadres of the army advancing south (南下干部), who not understand the local situation nor the local dialect had to absorb large numbers of people who could speak Mandarin as translators. They became intermediaries between the party committee, the government and the masses. However, most of them were members of opposition classes or their children, even counter-revolutionary themselves. This created serious impurity of the revolutionary forces. The Fujian provincial party committee specially studied this issue and sent a work team to East Fujian. At the same time the counter-rightist struggle was launched over the whole country. According to the statistics, in 1957 the prefecture dealt with 1579 impure cadres, which accounted for 10.74% of total cadres, and planned to deal with 400 to 500 more impure cadres.
In Xianyou County the conflicts between the “cadres of the army advancing south” and cadres who came from the old liberated area even turned into “a small Hungarian event”. The County party committee thought that the cadres of Xianyou underground party and guerrilla force formed “the counter-revolutionary bloc” and had raised “a wave of anti-cadres to the army advancing south” and might have mounted an armed coup (p322-23).
This kind of conflict between the “cadres of the army advancing south (南下干部)” and Fujian Province’s underground party and guerrilla force also happened in Quanzhou Prefecture (p122). On 8th June 1957 the Central CCP directive to carry out attacks on Rightists proclaimed that the anti-leftist-flavours’ rectification campaign within the party had diluted the rectification of corruption. Quanzhou Prefecture CCP (it was called Jinjiang Prefecture then) sent a report to the provincial Party committee of Fujian, that in the rectification campaign Fujian cadres who had founded the old liberated areas had criticised cadres of the army that had come south, that they were Right Opportunists and that localism should be included as a target in this new rectification campaign. They accused localists of feeling that the CCP owed a debt of gratitude to the people of the old liberated areas. This was against the people’s debt of gratitude to the Party. The struggle between the Party and localists was a manifestation of class struggle in the Party, not an inner-Party struggle. (pp 122-124)
Note: The “cadres of the army advancing south” were criticized at the anti-leftist flavours’ rectification campaign, whereas at the anti-rightist campaign the “cadres of the army advancing south” beat back the cadres whose background was the Fujian Province’s underground party and guerrilla force. In the end the former won the battle.
Fujian’s anti-localism happened in the context of the national “left” wind. In the history of CCP Fujian Province this event was on an unprecedented scale and was a significant case of injustice. The vitality of Fujian local officials was thereby badly wounded (p7).
The struggle between local Communists and PLA cadres from outside occurred in several other areas, and involved a series of campaigns to cleanse the ranks of party members that had included patriotic and pro-Communist landlords and merchants (see the work of Ngo Minh-hoang in Shaanxi). See also the work of Ralph Thaxton in Henan, where local cadres who were working covertly held positions of responsibility in the Chinese Puppet administration under the Japanese. There ensued, after 1949, a turning of campaigns for fair taxes and land redistribution into campaigns of class struggle.
In September 1957 at the Party’s Eighth session of three Central Committee plenary conferences Mao Zedong’s speech impelled a big debate about the organisation of agricultural production.
In November, People’s Daily published an editorial titled “mobilize all the people to discuss 40 regulations of agricultural development, starting an agricultural production new high tide”. It called for the critique of right-deviationist conservative [baoshou] thoughts in order to launch a Great Leap Forward on the production front. In implementing this spirit Fuzhou used a numbers of methods, e.g. mingfang [blooming], raising views in big ways, big-character posters, panels, seminars, and other forms, to expose and criticize rightist conservative thoughts. It prepared public opinion for the launch of the Great Leap Forward.(pp 225-226).
As the first wave of the great leap forward, there was a campaign of irrigation construction throughout China in the winter of 1957. Fujian province Party leadership was commended by the Central Committee for its ‘huge crowd’ mobilisation for the construction of water works. This was significant to Fujian because it suffered endemic drought. These works were meant to solve the problem of water shortage. But two fifths of the results were below standard (pp 15-18).
Formation of communes and a campaign to increase agricultural production and to produce iron ingots for steel production. Chen Boda, Mao’s political secretary and a native of Hui-an in Quanzhou prefecture (it was called Jinjiang Prefecture at the time), after a visit to Nan-an, another township in Quanzhou, in 1956 had recommended the merger of townships and cooperatives. In Red Flag and elsewhere in 1958 Chen Boda propagated Mao’s leading idea of the People’s Commune combining agriculture, industry, trade, education and militia. By October 1958 Fujian Province realized the idea with 630 people’s communes, formed from 2500 townships and 17000 cooperatives (p47-51).
Zhangzhou Prefecture (it was called Longtan Prefecture at the time) Party Committee organized a big debate that included the three topics of grain, the cooperatives and the legal system. For example, in four counties amongst 114,242 comments, grain accounted for 35%, the cooperatives for 27%, the legal system for 10%, the relation between industry and agriculture for 22%, and the leadership problem 6%. Some county and township officials made self-examinations for being “too slow”, and exclaimed that they wanted to “leap forward”. After that it was really a leap forward. Take “collect manure” as an example. It multiplied three times compared with 1957. The prefecture proposed some slogans: Construct fertilizer factories by the seashore, moving pans there for boiling the sea; break convention in spreading manure on the ground; remove mountains to rival male teams; for the sake of collecting manure, the heart is hot while water feels not cold, the mountain also works as a battlefield, taking farm tools as sword and spear to frighten the Earth god and startle the Dragon King to death (152-154). [Manure collection campaigns featured in all regions of Fujian]
In Jiaolu production brigade in Zhangzhou, the masses had different opinions about close planting. The production brigade then held a struggle meeting and put up a machine gun to frighten the masses, which seriously worsened the relationship between the party and the masses. The canteens were seriously wasteful. Many peasants, even some Party and Communist Youth League members and a Party chief noisily took the lead in withdrawing from the canteens. (pp 161-168)
Cutting down trees for furnaces to melt iron damaged hillsides. But there were also forestation projects on the seashore. For instance Dongshan County had for long been a windswept, sandy island. The County party committee formed a three-in-one combination afforestation experimental group of forestry technicians, officials and experienced peasants. It developed a suitable plan for the locality and a nursery plantation. The prefecture formulated a forestation policy, in which the County was in charge of County-wide forestation, the nation of state-owned, the Commune of Commune-owned land, and around the house individuals planted trees. In three years from 1959 there were more than 400 mountain tops and more than 30,000 mu of sandy beaches covered by trees. It fundamentally changed Dongshan’s environment from a desert island into a beautiful island with fragrant fruit and blossoms. (pp 167-168)
In 1957 Fuzhou’s cultivation of grain was 189,613 mu, output per mu was 386 jin, the total output 732,841 dan (about 100 jin/ per dan). In 1958 the cultivation of grain was 161,359 mu, output per mu was 385 jin, and the total output 621,376 dan, 15% less than 1957. However, the Fuzhou 1958 agricultural production general report claimed that in 1958 agricultural production“stars” or “satellites” had lit up in high a variety of colours, filling the sky with stars blossoming everywhere. On 15th July 1958 Lianban Agricultural Cooperative, Chengmen Township, Minhou County launched a big “satellite” claiming that their output of early rice was 5806.85 jin per mu. The first secretary of the CCP Provincial Committee Ye Fei went there to congratulate them in person. On 11th October, Hongshaying brigade, Chengmen Commune shot up a bigger “satellite” of 11,741.5 jin per mu. On the 11th, Nanyu Commune shot up a super “satellite” of 22,204 jin per mu.[All these were in emulation of and competition with Ye Fei’s model.] (p229-30)
Along with the Communist wind, Chengmeng commune of Minhou County started the first Commune Canteen of the whole province. It also offered a supply system with a “package of 10”: eating, wearing, using, giving birth, elderly care, sickness, death, education, bathing, even hairdressing were free for commune members but paid entirely by the commune. In order to realise this idea they made the rich share with the poor by taking away resources from the rich and distributing them to the poor (levelling and transferring, yiping erdiao). For example, a rich village called Kuiqi was levelled and transferred 40,000 yuan from village property, which amounted to 162 yuan per villager to the Commune or above; Yuanyang Village was levelled and transferred 150,000 jin rice and 30 boats; Pingyuan Commune was levelled and transferred 6,027 pigs; Pingtan County was levelled and transferred 3.38 million labourers, 7408 mu land, 579 fishing boats. In Fuzhou City the total value of materials levelled and transferred amounted to more than 27 million yuan and 120,000 mu of land (p234). Then Xushui County’s “15 packages” were promoted nationwide and Huangshi People’s Commune of Putian County implemented a “17 packages” supply system to its members (p315).
The Fujian Provincial Party Committee and Provincial People’s Congress repeatedly wrote to the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao asking for support for Fujian-based industries, including chemical, machinery, iron and steel, and light industrial systems. The CPC Central Committee approved the establishing of chemical and steel factory and other construction projects in Fujian before the “second five year plan”. After two surveys and a review the provincial party committee, in January 1958, decided to build a steel factory and a chemical factory in Sanming County. Sanming Iron and Steel Factory was started in August 1958 and completed by January 1959. The annual output was 200,000 tons of iron, 120,000 tons of steel, 80,000 tons of steel materials. It formed an infrastructure projects system with workshops of steel-making, steel rolling, power, casting, seamless tube and the corresponding railway line, roads, bridges, utilities and heat, etc. It could have taken 20 years to construct this scale of project before liberation, and four years before the great leap forward. However, because of an overemphasis on speed overlooked quality results, Sanming Iron and Steel Factory lost 11.111 million yuan the first year, and after successive losses it was not until 1978 that it turned to win. (pp 249-155)
A similar story was told us in 2004 about the founding of the large steel smelter in Hutou, Anxi.
In Nanping, northern Fujian, 9% of cadres were later found to have used force to implement orders, including hitting, verbal abuse, tying people up, imposing fines, making people kneel, locking them up, criticizing and denouncing someone in public, inserting a white flag on somebody, and even hounding someone to death [actually quite mild compared to elsewhere in China]. In 1958, Laizhou production team boasted its grain output per mu amounted to 1600 jin, but it was in fact 370 jin. The team became a model team. However, the head of the team felt too embarrassed to receive as reward a big red flag. After the Working Group carried out “ideological work” several times the red flag was carried back (p285-86). In a mountain area 1,800 small villages were forced to merge into bigger villages outside the mountain area. Eventually the mountain villagers couldn’t settle and moved back to their original residences (p286).
March and April 1959
After a series of meetings from November 1958 to summer 1959, Mao and the Central Committee acknowledged that there had been ‘leftist’ mistakes. In March 1959 Mao Zedong wrote four letters to every provincial, major city, and autonomous regions’ first secretary of the CCP in which he repeatedly stressed the issue of “caring for the masses’ benefits all the time” (p55) A letter by Mao dated 29th April was also circulated to six levels of officials and cadres from province, prefecture, county, commune, production brigade and production team. He urged people to pay attention only to realistic possibilities, withstanding unrealistic targets while working with zeal to raise production, and allowing households to take responsibility for some production alongside collectives (p63).
Chen Boda, Mao’s political secretary, visited Jinjiang 22 Jan – 16 Feb 1959 and in his report he affirmed the People’s Communes but recommended that production targets should be discussed and decided in conjunction with the masses, that the supply system should be organised strictly in accordance with work, that officials should treat the masses as their relatives, and that cadres should gain most of their income from production and only for the time working as a cadre be paid an allowance. (p. 137)
The Central Disaster Relief Office included Fujian in 15 provinces with a severe shortage of grain. Premier Zhou En-lai sends a request to the first Party Secretary of Fujian to conduct an investigation.
A wave of retractions of policy on public canteens, distribution and the organisation of production and the lowering of production targets followed. They were heralded by apologies from cadres at all levels. Fujian province’s Party Secretary Ye Fei apologised to an enlarged meeting of 14,000 officials (pp 55-56). This was the start of a campaign of rectification, of cadres giving accounts and apologising.
Not only was there a grain shortage, pork and egg production was half what it was at the same time the previous year and there was an acute lack of cooking utensils and farm tools. Complaints and criticisms were allowed on big character posters. (pp 67-68)
Examples of four ‘unhealthy tendencies’ were publicised.
The first was commandism and the use of force. Examples given were not just labelling someone a rightist, stabbing them with a white flag (putting a white flag against their name), but then adding further prosecution, even the death penalty in four cases. Another was the persecution of a woman for having kept a fund of 400 rmb that she had earned instead of giving it to the Commune. She committed suicide when not allowed even to keep a few rmb (p74).
The second was empty boasting of yields per mu, and punishing with white flags those who express any doubts (p76).
The third was cadres taking advantage of their positions, embezzlement of public funds, and lack of financial accountability. Over two fifths of Fujian’s team leaders in the province were found guilty of these offences by investigators. (pp 76-77).
The fourth was treating people badly. Apologies from over 40,000 cadres were, according to reports of the campaign, accepted by 95% of the 185,754 people to whom apologies were made in Fujian.
In Jinjiang Prefecture Mao’s April 29th letter was received on May 4th and relayed to Communes and production teams that same day with a message from Jinjiang’s first secretary that he owed a debt of apology to older brothers and sisters for the big loss in agricultural production over the last half year. (pp 132-133).
Cadres made public self-criticisms. Some returned funds they had diverted. Rectified accounts were shown to the masses. Teams were given more responsibility for production. Households could raise pigs, poultry, and rabbits and were given plots to garden. (p134)
Xiamen’s 12 People’s communes in rural areas started a “do accounts and rectification campaign”: they did accounts and returned as much property as possible to institutions or individuals and allowed members of communes to raise poultry and livestock and restored private plots (p296). From June to September 1959 Xiamen was attacked by typhoons with the result, according to statistics, of a total loss of 33 million yuan and more than 200 dead (p.297)
In Western Fujian, the poorest region in the province, at the beginning of 1959 Longyan Prefecture launched a campaign of “doing accounts, reorganising people’s communes and rectifying officials’ working style”. It resulted in accounts calculated, inspected and verified between the state and the people’s commune, the people’s commune and the production brigade, the production brigade and the production team. Property, cash and the material objects were refunded to collectives or individuals. Officials and cadres enhanced their ideological awareness, formed closer relationships between the party and the masses, and established the thought that the cadres and masses were masters of their own affairs. The masses responded with “four haves” (more energy because production was better accounted; more to eat because concealed grain was openly used; more money because more money could be distributed; more right to speak). Therefore, the masses truly realized the sense of mastering of their own affairs. (pp 187-189)
In eastern Fujian (bordering Zhejiang) (p215-18) after doing the accounts it was found that the prefecture owed the people’s communes 35,163 million yuan and it repaid 30,765 million yuan. The people’s communes owed the accounting unit (brigade or team) 12,555 million yuan. Material objects or money that belonged to individuals also had to be refunded or else a plan was made to refund them. 90% of cadres who used force or broke laws made self-criticisms in public meetings, symposia or individual visits to apologise.
In Fuzhou, from the end of 1958 to July 1959 was the period of correcting leftist mistakes. Mao Zedong’s letter to cadres at all levels eased the tension between party and mass [dangqun, which had been damaged by ganqun – cadre-mass - relations], and smoothed the relationship between officials and masses [ganqun]. According to instructions from the central and provincial authorities all property and materials which were levelled and transferred from individuals and collectives should be returned back to them. However, less than half was actually returned due to the great waste of the communalization period. Also in the rectification campaign, corrupt use of funds and property was sorted out. For example, a suburban commune exposed 68 cases of graft or embezzled of public funds amounting to a total of 10,000 yuan, collectively hidden sweet potato, rice, peanuts and other valuable food stores of 10,000 yuan. [NB no apology is mentioned in this Fuzhou section]
Nanping prefectural Party committee formed a “Working Group to rectify people’s communes”. In March 1959, the whole prefecture held a five-levels cadre meeting on the People’s Communes. The grassroots cadres made many comments, such as the comment boasting about Great Leap Forward, one level of cadres lied to another, farmers lied to cadres after them. They also described commune members’ working attitude: get out to work when the sun is bright, line up and walk to the fields as curved as a dragon, walk tinkle and clank for half a day, inch by inch move into a field, work as messily as crowded bees, two days’ work less than one day’s worth (pp 275-278)
July and August 1959 - 1960
After the Lushan Conference of the enlarged Politburo meeting of the CCP, in which Peng Dehuai’s letter pointing out the mistakes of the GLF was denounced as an anti-Party, Anti-Right-Opportunist campaign, commenced with renewed use of white flags, implemented by Province Party Secretary Ye Fei in Fujian. The secretary of the provincial Party secretariat, Jiang Yizhen, was accused among the 84,247 provincial cadres criticised. He was removed from his position, but he appealed for an investigation, saying that he made some mistakes but they did not amount to being against the Party. Six months later the investigating team of the provincial Party withdrew the Anti-Rightist-Opportunist label and he was restored to his position. (pp 78-80). The implication is that appeals such as his could be made with hope of success at all Party levels below. Nevertheless a reverse rectification campaign was carried out criticising local cadres for removing public canteens and lowering targets of production. The proportion of households eating in public canteens was raised again from 50 to over 80%. Household responsibility for production was withdrawn and household plots requisitioned again for public canteens, and steel production re-emphasised with a new battle for coal and iron. Communes were organised in cities.
According to the report from Nanping City in Northern Fujian, it was called a campaign of rectification of the cadres’ working style and reorganizing communes. Protecting the party’s general line was the central task. Within the party and the government departments it was called rectification, whereas in rural areas it was called a socialist educational movement, which lasted from November 1959 until April 1960.
In August 1959, the Plenary Session of the Eighth Conference in Fuzhou launched an anti-rightist struggle. 577 officials and cadres were criticized and turned into “degeneratists”, “serious (yanzhong) rightist (youqing) thoughts (sixiang)”, “right opportunists (youqing jihuizhuyi fenzi)”, or “anti-party rightist opportunists (youqing jihuizhuyi fandang fenzi)”. They were purged [pingfan] in 1962.
In order to meet the need for “more Great Leap Forward”, the Fuzhou Party Committee set up a target of industrial output value for the city at 580-640 million yuan in 1959, which was 125-150% growth over 1958. At the same time the communist wind blew again. Production brigades, communes, even government-owned factories and enterprises in urban government departments and schools blew the communist wind to the suburbs, namely, to level and transfer property from the suburbs. According to statistics, 285 work units of urban-industrial enterprises, government offices and schools participated in it. They levelled and transferred cash to the value of 33,539 yuan, requisitioned land to the value of 58,498 yuan, 6,176 mu of land, 29 mu of fish ponds, 66,000 seedling trees, 53944 jin of rice, 11,660 jin of paddy, 36 houses, 163 pieces of farm tools, 153,173 labourers, etc.. In addition, suburban communes proposed to achieve “four ten thoughts” – 10,000 treasures in mountains, 10,000 hoggeries, 10,000 chicken farms, 10,000 duck farms. (238-241)
Strangely (the report says) nearly all first party secretaries of prefectures were correct in Fujian Province. The only exception was Longxi Prefecture’s. People who had differences with the first secretaries received criticism in the counter-rightist deviation struggle. In Longxi prefecture 815 officials, 440 cadres from the production teams upward, and 415 Party members and officials in public transportation enterprises, etc,. were identified as Rightist Opportunists. By the end of 1961 most of them took off their Rightist Opportunist hats. (pp 169-170)
From 25th September to the end of November Putian county fought four great battles of smelting steel and iron. It put up three “satellites” and all became number one of the entire province: first to break daily output of 200 tons; first to realize daily 1000 tons; record of daily output of 4005.259 tons. However, it actually resulted in total losses of 3.28 million yuan; the state subsidized 1.14 million yuan (p312).
In Zhangzhou, as part of the report says, there was successful reforestation and defences against desertification, for instance in Dongshan County, turning it into a island fragrant with fruit and flowers (pp 166-167) And the industrialisation of Zhangzhou did establish a base of agriculture-related industries, but at terrible cost to agricultural production and tremendous waste in useless iron (156-159).
In Western Fujian, Longyan Prefecture carried out the counter-right deviation struggle by collecting views and comments on the Great Leap Forward and published “Longyan Prefecture rightist opportunist thoughts and major arguments”. It stipulated that no more than 1% of the total population should be criticised. But poor and lower middle peasants became objects of criticism. In Wuping County 47.6% of lower middle and poor peasants were accused, in Yongding County 46.9%, and in Longyan County 49.8%.
By the winter of 1959 23,000 people suffered oedema and pneumonia and abnormal deaths came to 1,619. The main reason for abnormal deaths was grain underproduction. Longyan prefecture’s grain yield was only 71 million jin in 1960, cultivation had ceased on more than 300,000 mu, and the state procured 41 million jin from the prefecture. After the state’s procurement, people in many areas were left with almost no grain. Commune members’ working times were excessively long. In the movement to oppose Rightist deviation and uncover concealed output some local officials and cadres took back members’ plots of land and even took away anything eatable from members’ homes. The prefecture Party committee’s main leaders’ bureaucratic work-style was seriously problematic, covering up the truth of shortage of grain, of sickness and of abnormal death.
The urban population in Nanping, northern Fujian, increased from 322,114 in 1957 to 648,992 in 1961, the proportion of urban population from 16.6% in 1957 increased to 27.9% in 1961. This resulted in making the agricultural burden even heavier and in a severe shortage of grain, and led to famine (p288-89).
However, the GLF could not be relaunched every where in Fujian. In 1959 with the shadow of food shortages over Nanping, the poorest in Northern Fujian Province, people’s revolutionary enthusiasm could not be reignited any more. In August the original plan for industrial and agricultural output was 66% of the plan. At the end of the year the vigorous Great Leap Forward ended quietly [CX note: this ended the Great Leap Forward earlier].
On 15th May 1960 the Central Committee of the CCP sent out an instruction on “three counters” in rural areas, namely “counter-embezzlement, counter-waste, and counter-bureaucratism”; a so-called “new three counters campaign”.
This new three counters campaign was interwoven with the anti-rightist deviation struggle. It improved Putian County’s cadres’ attitude towards the masses, made closer the relationship between the party and the masses, and the collective economy also obtained some strengthening. However, in some places the masses fought with each other and even beat the cadres. Widening the scope of attack meant that large numbers of cadres suffered injustice. (pp 316-318).
From the end of September 1959 to July 1960 Putian suffered 169 days of great drought and three typhoon attacks. Putian entered an extremely difficult time.
In November 1960 the Central Committee of the CCP sent out an “instruction letter on people’s communes' current policy”.
On 12th October 1960 the CPC Central Committee had issued “important instructions for transmitting two documents from Hubei Provincial Party Committee and Fujian Provincial Party Committee.” The Central Committee demanded all local party committees to copy their methods of rectification immediately by sending work teams to the communes with the most problems and to settle two fundamental issues: to correct egalitarian levelling and the communist wind, and to make sure the large number of labourers return to agricultural production (p351, events).
In January 1961 the CCP promulgated its official decision to end the Great Leap Forward campaign and implement a guideline policy of “adjustment, consolidation, enrichment and enhancement” of production.(p173-75)
In 1960, Zhangzhou Prefecture suffered rare catastrophic floods, destroying grain, making houses collapse and killing domestic animals. The three years of the Great Leap Forward plus the natural disaster caused falls in grain yield to 116.8 million jin in 1961 (from 1957 154.3 million, 1958 133.9 million, 1959 133.6 million, and 1960 121.5 million). People in Heping County only got 11 jin grain per person per month. Zhangzhou’s orange harvest suffered a drop to 60%, jute 73.62%, sugar cane 57.26%, peanuts 63.4%, pig purchases were reduced to 51%, chicken and duck 77%. (pp 195-198)
In Western Fujian, Prefecture party committees and the government realized that the three years’ Great Leap Forward had caused serious difficultlies, mainly through the fault of the prefecture’s leadership, not just natural disasters [NB this is at the time], and that the relationship between industrial and agricultural development had been wrong. It had reassigned 200,000 work forces from rural areas to engage in non-agricultural work which meant that 300,000 mu of land had gone out of cultivation. The movements of “white flags” and “opposing rightist deviation” in 1958 and 1959 had damaged the Party’s principle of democratic centralism and dampened the broad cadres’ and masses’ enthusiasm. Objective law was ignored and a wind of excessive and inappropriate common ownership blew. For instance in 1960 commune members’ pigs were collectivised and this caused the death of 300,000 pigs. Another example is ignoring local natural conditions, blindly promoting the planting of 100,000 mu of Korean stem rice and reaping nothing. Force was in vogue. For example, in Shizhong people's commune of Longyan County 1,434 were assigned to construct Lingkeng reservoir. In enforcing this, cadres stopped meals for 224 people, bundled, tied up, hanged and hit 549 people, killing 17 people and 38 people died at home from severe wounds. The masses called Lingkeng reservoir “Yanlo Wang’s [the king of purgatory’s] people’s commune”.
这是由王斯福教授领导和ESRC资助 (2002-06年) 的 "痛失亲人的传输与确认：中国的大跃进的文献研究"项目的成果的一部分 '。这是根据‘大跃进运动(福建卷)”, 福建省中国共产党历史研究部, 北京: 中国共产党史出版社, 2001年
第一t: 1956至57年的反左 (1956年9月的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第一次会议)及1957年6月开始的反右(1956年11月第8届中国共产党中央委员会第二次会议)开展一个党对主观主义，宗派主义及官僚主义的改正运动。1957年9月20日至10月10日的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第三次会议强调无产阶级与资产阶级及社会主义道路与资本主义道路的矛盾是中国社会的主要矛盾。另外，会议认为1956年的纠正左倾冒进是错的。
第二: 1958至59年的反左 (1958年11月至12月的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第六次会议)。这是 "大跃进"运动发动后党第一次纠正毛泽东造成的左倾错误。1959年4月2日至5日在上海举行的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第七次会议总结了运动: 通过一系列管理原则去纠正公有化及人民公社制度中的左倾错误。会议再次批评了"冒进", 然后从1959年8月至1960年反对右倾机会主义者。1959年8月在庐山举行的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第八次会议发动了对彭德怀领导的反党集团右倾机会主义的斗争。
第三: 1961年的反左。1961年1月举行的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第九次会议正式通过对国民经济的重组, 其八字原则为"调整, 巩固, 强化和改进"。这终结了"大跃进"。 然后在1962年的反右社会主义教育运动(1962年9月的第8届中国共产党中央委员会第十次会议)中, 毛泽东主持了会议并提出了一个关于阶级, 处境, 矛盾和党的团结的报告。他提出"不要忘记阶级斗争"。 会议发动了另一轮对彭德怀的批判和斗争。它也批判所谓"黑暗风"及"翻案风", 为后来1966年发动反修正主义文化大革命作出了意识形态和理论上的准备。
1956年9月的中国共产党八届一中全会标志着中国综合性发展社会建设的一个折腾时期的开始。在这个会议上刘少奇在他的政治报告中清楚地指出我们将来必须在意识形态上和组织上与腐败和堕落斗争并从党中清除积习难改的, 堕落的和腐败的元素。 在11月党的八届二中全会上刘少奇再次强调预防领导特权的需要。毛泽东在会议上也警告党需要警惕不要在党内形成一个将党和群众分开的 “贵族阶层”。 根据毛泽东的建议, 会议决定从1957年下半年开始展开一个“党内整风运动”。运动的目标是去纠正主观主义, 宗派主义和官僚主义。1957年4月27日中共中央委员会发出“整风运动的指示”。他们清楚定义了整风运动的目的, 要求, 原则和方法。它在5月1日被刊登在“人民日报”上并正式开始了全党的整风运动。
总的来说, 中共中央委员会在1956年9月的党八中全会中建议了一个平衡的指引。它是反保守及反对“冒进”, 并继续稳定经济发展的。为了执行这些的指引, 福州市根据现实的情况, 政治和经济发展出一系列的政策。福州在1957年完成了第一个五年经济计划, 收入提高了, 物价稳定, 人民的生活水准得到改善, 干部的工作作风是民主的, 社会稳定, 党在群众中的威信是高的, 群众相信社会主义革命及建设的主张, 而对党的号召一呼百唤。
福建东部的宁德地委在5月16日制定了一个“应付不纯的干部”的计划“。它认为在解放初年, 由于闽东的'南下军队干部'不明白当地的情况和方言，他们必须吸收大量可以讲普通话的人作为翻译员。他们成为了党委，政府与群众之间的中介。 然而，他们的大多数或他们的子女是反对阶级的成员，甚至自己是反革命的。这造成了革命力量的严重不纯洁。福建省委专门研究这个问题，并派出工作组到闽东。与此同时反右派斗争在全国展开。据统计，县在1957年处理了1579个不纯的干部, 占干部总数的10.74％，并计划多处理400至500个不纯的干部。
当地的共产党员和外来的人民解放军干部之间的斗争在其他几个地区发生，并涉及了一系列清洗包含了爱国和亲共的地主和商人党员的运动（见陕西Ngo Minh-hoang的工作)。也可以参看Ralph Thaxton 在河南的工作，在那里地方干部在日本统治下的中国傀儡政权担任有责任的职位。还有随之而来在1949年后，公平税收和土地再分配的运动转变为阶级斗争的运动。
公社的形成和一个增加农业生产和生产用于钢铁生产的铁锭的运动。毛泽东的政治秘书陈伯达是泉州县(当时被称为晋江县)惠安人。他在泉州另一个乡镇南安的一次参观后在1956年曾经建议乡镇与合作社合并。陈伯达于1958年在红旗杂志和其他地方传播毛泽东关于人民公社结合农业，工业，贸易，教育和民兵的概念。福建省在1958年10月实现了由2500 个乡镇和17000个合作社组成的630个人民公社的计划 (47-51页).
漳州县(当时被称为龙潭县)党委组织了包括粮食，合作社和法律制度三个主题的大讨论。例如，在四个县的114.242意见当中，粮食占35％，合作社占27％，法律体系占10％，工业和农业之间的关系占22％，及领导问题占6％。一些县和乡镇官员做出了“太慢”的自我检讨，并惊呼他们想“跃进”。之后它是一个真正的飞跃。以“拾粪”为例, 它比1957年增长了3倍。县提出了一些口号: 在海边兴建化肥厂，将锅子搬到那里去把海洋煮沸; 打破惯例将粪便撒在地上; 移山与男性团队较量; 为了拾粪，心是热而感觉水不冷，山也作为一个战场，将农具作为刀和枪去吓唬土地神和将龙王吓死(152-154页)。[在福建各地区都有粪便收集运动]
1957年福州的粮食种植是189,613亩, 每亩生产是386斤, 总生产是732,841担 (大约每担100斤)。1958年的粮食种植是161,359亩, 每亩生产是385斤, 而总生产是621,376担, 比1957年少15%。但是, 1958年福州农业生产综合报告宣称1958年农业生产的“星”或“卫星”已经点燃了各种颜色, 尽显天上的星星朵朵无处不在。1958年7月15日连扳农业合作社, 城门镇, 闽侯县开展了大“卫星”, 声称早稻的产量每亩5806.85斤。中共省委第一书记叶飞去那里亲自向他们表示祝贺。在10月11日, 红沙营大队, 城门公社射出了一个亩产11,741.5斤更大的“卫星”。南屿公社在11日发射了一个亩产22204斤的超级“卫星” [所有这些都是模拟和叶飞模式竞争的] (229-30页)
随着共产风, 闽侯县城蒙公社启动了全省第一个公社食堂。它也提供了一个“包10”的供应系统：吃, 穿, 用, 分娩, 老人护理, 病, 死, 教育, 洗浴, 甚至理发对公社成员也是免费的, 完全由公社支付。为了实现这个想法, 他们通过把富人的资源拿走使他们与穷人分享资源, 并将它们分配给穷人 (夷平而调)。例如, 一个叫魁奇的富有村庄被夷平并被从乡村财产转移4万元, 即每位村民162元给公社或以上; 远扬村被夷平及转移15万斤米和30膄船; 平原公社被夷平和转移6,027头猪; 平摊公社被夷平和转移338万劳工, 7408亩地, 579膄渔船。在福州市, 被夷平和转移的材料总值超过2700万元和12万亩地 (234页)。 然后徐水县的“15套餐”在全国范围内被推广而莆田县黄石人民公社实行了一个“17套餐”的供应系统给它的成员 (315页).
福建省委和省人大多次写信给党中央和毛主席要求支持以福建为基地的工业, 包括化工, 机械, 钢铁和轻工业系统。中共中央在“第二个五年计划”前批准在福建设立化工和钢铁厂等建设项目。省委经过两项调查和一个审查后于1958年1月决定在三明县开建设一个钢铁厂及一个化工厂。三明钢铁工厂在1958年8月开始建设及在1959年1月完成。年产量是20万吨铁, 12万吨钢, 8万吨钢材料。它形成了一个附有炼钢, 轧钢, 电力, 铸造, 无缝管车间和相应的铁路线, 公路, 桥梁, 水电和热等的基础设施项目系统。解放前要花20年时间去建这个规模的项目而大跃进前需要4年的时间。但是, 由于过分强调速度但忽视质量的结果, 三明钢铁厂第一年损失1千1百11万1000元, 之后连年亏损, 直到1978年它才转为赢. (249-155页)
在福建北部的南平, 9％的干部后来被发现有使用暴力去执行命令, 其中包括打, 骂, 将人捆绑起来, 处以罚款, 让人下跪, 把他们锁起来, 在公众场合批评和谴责人, 将白旗插入人, 甚至把人弄死[实际上和中国其他地方比是相当温和]。在1958年, 莱州生产队吹嘘其粮食产量每亩达1600斤, 但它实际上是370斤。该队成为了模范队。但是, 队的领导觉得不好意思接受作为奖励一面大红旗。经过工作组开展几次“思想工作”后红旗被取回 (285-86页)。 在一个山区, 1800条小村庄被迫合并到山区以外更大的村庄。最终山村民不能定居, 并搬回原来的住所 (286页)。
经过从1958年11月到1959年夏天的一系列的会议, 毛泽东和中央委员会承认曾有过“左”的错误。毛泽东在1959年3月写了四封信给每个省, 主要城市和自治区的中国共产党的第一书记, 反复强调所有时间“关心群众的利益“的问题 (55页)。毛泽东一封4月29日的信也被分发给省, 地, 县，公社, 生产大队和生产小组的六个级别的官员和干部。他呼吁人民只注意现实的可能性, 顶住不切实际的目标及同时以工作热情提高生产, 并允许农户承担一些集体生产的责任 (63页)。
毛泽东的政治秘书陈伯达在1959年1月22日至2月16日参观晋江并在他的报告中肯定了人民公社, 但建议生产目标应该被讨论及与群众一起决定。供应系统应该严格地按照工作来组织, 官员应该把群众当作他们的亲戚而干部应该从生产得到他们的大部分收入, 并且只能被支付津贴作为一个干部的工作时间。(137页)
随后有一波对公共食堂，分销, 生产组织和降低生产指标的政策收缩。他们都预示了各级干部的道歉。福建省党委书记叶非在扩大会议中向14,000官员道歉 (55-56页)。 这是一个纠正及干部提供账户和道歉的运动的开始。
首先是命令主义和武力的使用。给的例子不仅是标签一个人右派, 插他们一面白旗 (将一面白旗放在他们的名字旁边), 更加上进一步的迫害, 在四个案件甚至是死刑。另一个是迫害一个把她赚的400块人民币收起来而不是将之交给公社的女人。那个女人由于留起几块人民币都不被允许而自杀。 (74页)
在晋江县, 毛泽东4月29日的信在5月4日被收到, 并在同一天转达给公社和生产队, 内附晋江第一书记关于他欠了年长的兄弟姐妹在过去半年在农业生产上的大损失的一个道歉。(132-133页).
厦门在郊区的12个人民公社开始了一个“做账和整风运动“: 他们算了账及尽可能归还财产给机构或个人, 并允许公社成员增加畜禽和恢复自留地 (296页)。厦门从1959年6月到9月受到台风的袭击而结果根据统计一共损失3千3百万元和超过200人死亡 (297页)。
在闽西, 全省最贫穷的地区, 在1959年初龙岩县推出了一个“做账, 重组人民公社和整顿官员作风”的运动。这导致了政府和人民公社, 人民公社和生产大队, 生产大队和生产队之间的帐户被计算, 考察和验证。财产, 现金和物资被退还给集体或个人。官员和干部提高了自身的思想认识, 形成了党和人民群众之间更密切的关系, 并建立了干部和群众是他们自己事务的主人的思想。群众报以“四有” (更多的能量因为产量被更好地计算, 吃得更多因为被隐蔽的粮食被公开使用; 更多的钱因为更多的钱可以被分发; 更多的话语权)。因此, 广大人民群众真正发现了掌握自己的事情的感觉 (187-189页)。
在闽东(与浙江接壤) (215-18页) 做账目后发现县欠人民公社35163万元, 并已经偿还30765元。人民公社欠会计单位(生产大队或小组) 12,555元。属于个人的物品或金钱也不得不退还或制定计划退还给他们。90％曾经使用武力或犯法的干部在公开会议和专题讨论会中作了自我批评, 或在个人的访问中表示了歉意。
在福州, 从1958年年底到1959年7月是纠正左倾错误的时期。毛泽东给各级干部的信缓解了党和群众之间的紧张关系[党群, 已被干群 - 干部群众关系损坏], 和润滑了官员和群众[干群]之间的关系。根据中央和省委的指示, 所有从个人和集体被夷平和转移的财产和物资应该归还给他们。但是, 由于公社化时代的大量浪费, 实际上只有少于一半被归还。另外, 在整治运动中, 资金和财产的腐败使用被清理整顿。 例如, 一个郊外公社揭发68宗贪污公款达1万元, 集体隐藏红薯, 大米, 花生和其他有价值食品达1万元 [NB 在福州的部分没有提到道歉]。
南平地委成立了一个“整顿人民公社的工作组”。1959年3月，全县举行了一个关于人民公社的五级干部会议。基层干部提出了许多意见，像吹嘘大跃进的意见，一级干部骗另一个级干部, 农民骗了干部。他们也形容了公社社员的工作态度：阳光灿烂的时候出来上班，排队步行到田间弯曲如一条龙，走叮当与叮当半天，一寸一寸地移动到一块田，像乱七八糟拥挤的蜜蜂般工作，两天的工作不到一天的价值 (275-278页)
在中共中央政治局扩大会议的庐山会议上因为彭德怀的信指出了大跃进的失误而被指责为反党后，反右倾机会主义运动通过使用新的白旗重新开始，由省委书记叶飞在福建实施。省委书记的秘书蒋毅震是被批评了的84, 247个省级干部中被指责的其中一个。他被撤了职, 但他提出进行调查, 说他犯了一些错误但它们并没有达到反党的地步。六个月后省党调查组撤回他的反右倾机会主义者的帽子而他则被恢复他的职位 (78-80 页)。言下之意是像他这样的上诉在党的各级都可以在成功的希望下进行。然而同时有一个相反的整风运动被推行去批评地方干部去除公共食堂和降低生产目标。在公共食堂吃饭的家庭比例由50%再次提高到80％以上。家庭包产到户被撤回, 自留地再次被征用作公共食堂, 而钢铁的生产通过煤炭和铁的一个新战斗再次被强调。城市也组织公社。
1959年8月, 福州第八届会议的全体会议发动了反右斗争。577个官员和干部被批判及变成"堕落者”, "严重右倾思想", “右倾机会主义分子”, 或“右倾机会主义反党分子“。他们在1962年被平反。
为了满足“更大大跃进”的需要, 福州党委在1959年定下了全市工业总产值为5.8至6.4亿人民币的目标, 这是1958年的125-150％的增长。这时共产风又刮起。生产大队, 公社, 甚至政府拥有的工厂和城市政府部门的企业和学校都将共产风吹到了郊区, 即从郊区平分和转移财产。285个市区工业企业的工作单位政府办公室和学校参与在内。他们铲平和转移了33,539元价值的现金，征用了58,498元价值的土地，6,176亩土地，29亩鱼塘，66,000苗木，53,944斤大米，11,660斤稻谷，36间房子，163件农具，153,173劳工等。此外，郊区公社提出要实现“四个十想法” - 10,000山珍品，10,000 养猪场，10,000 养鸡场，10,000 万养鸭场 (238-241页)。
奇怪地, (报告说) 差不多所有福建省的县委第一书记都是正确的。唯一的例外是陇西县。那些与第一书记有差异的人在反右派偏差斗争中受到了批评。在陇西县有815个官员，440个从生产队以上的干部和415个党员及公共交通企业的官员等被认定为右倾机会主义者。 到1961年底他们大多数被除去他们的右倾机会主义者的帽子 (169-170页)
莆田县从9月25日至11月底转战冶炼钢铁的四大战役。它推出了三个“卫星”，并全部成为全省第一：第一个打破日产量200吨; 率先实现每日一千吨; 每天4005.259吨产量的记录。然而，它实际上造成了328万元的总损失; 国家补助了114万元 (312页).
报告的一部分称在漳州有成功的重新造林和对荒漠化的防御, 例如东山县把它变成一个有水果和鲜花的岛香 (166-167页)。而漳州的产业化确实建立了一个农产业基地, 但造成了农业生产的可怕代价和无用的铁的极大浪费 (156-159页).
在闽西, 龙岩县通过收集关于大跃进的看法和意见, 并发表“龙岩县右倾机会主义思想和主要论点”展开反右倾斗争。它规定不超过1％的总人口应该受到批评。但贫下中农成为批评的对象。在武平县, 47.6％的下中农和贫农被指控, 在永定县46.9％, 而在龙岩县49.8％。
到1959年冬天, 23,000人遭遇水肿和肺炎, 而非正常死亡的人数达到1,619人。非正常死亡的主要原因是粮食减产。1960年龙岩县的粮食产量只有7,100万斤, 超过30万亩已经停止种植, 而国家从县内采购了4,100万斤。经过国家的采购后, 许多地区的人们都几乎没有粮食。公社成员的工作时间过长。在反右倾偏差和发现隐藏的生产的运动中一些地方官员和干部拿回成员的地块, 甚至从成员家带走任何可以吃的东西。县党委主要领导“的官僚作风有严重的问题, 隐瞒粮食短缺, 疾病及非正常死亡的事实。
然而, 大跃进不能在福建的所有地方被再发动。1959年闽北最贫穷的南平在粮食短缺的影子下, 人民的革命热情不能再被重新点燃。8月工农业生产的计划是原来计划的66%。轰轰烈烈的大跃进在年底稍稍地结束 [注 这提早结束了大跃进]。
1960年10月12日中共中央发出了“从湖北省委和福建省委转递两份文件"的重要指示。中央委员会要求各地方党委立即复制他们的方法去派遣工作组到最多的问题的公社，解决两个基本问题: 去纠正平均主义水平和共产风，并确保大量劳动力返回农业生产 (351页, 活动).
1960年漳州县遭受了罕见的特大洪涝灾害, 摧毁了粮食, 使房屋倒塌和家畜死亡。三年的大跃进加上自然灾害使粮食生产在1961年降至一亿一千六百八十万斤 (从from 1957年的一亿五千四百三十万斤, 1958年的一亿三千三百九十万斤, 1959年的一亿三千三百六十万斤和1960年的一亿二千一百五十万斤)。 和平县的人民只拿到了每人每月11斤粮食。 漳州的橙收获下降了60％, 黄麻73.62％, 甘蔗57.26％, 花生63.4％, 猪的购买减少了51％, 鸡和鸭减少了77％ (195-198页)。
在闽西, 县党委和政府意识到三年大跃进造成了严重的困难, 主要是因为县领导的错误, 而不仅是自然灾害[注：这是在当时], 而工业和农业发展之间的关系是错的。他们已经从农村地区调派20万的劳动力从事非农业工作, 这意味着30万亩的土地没有被耕种。1958年和1959年的“白旗”和“反右倾偏差”运动破坏了党的民主集中制原则, 挫伤了广大干部群众的积极性。客观规律被忽视和吹一股不恰当的共同所有权的风。例如公社成员的猪在1960年被公有化而导致了30万头猪的死亡。另一个例子是无视当地的自然状况，盲目地促进种植10万亩的韩国干大米而什么收获都没有。权力横行。例如, 在龙岩县适中人民公社, 1,434个公社社员被分配去建筑堎坑水库。在执行的过程中, 干部将224人停餐和捆绑, 将549人吊起来打, 结果造成17人死亡和38人在家中死亡的严重伤害。群众叫堎坑水库“阎罗王[炼狱之王]人民公社”。
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